Introduction 1
Assessment of financial performance of microfinance organisations (MFOs) is far from perfect, but it is fair to s ay that it is institutionalised.
2 Rules and norms govern these activities sufficiently strongly that: (a) almost nobody questions why it should be done, and (b) agreed standards and routines govern how. The key question to be explored here is whether it would be desirable t o achieve a s imilar degree of institutionalisation for goal s etting, monitoring, assessment and auditing of the social performance of MFOs, and if so how to go about it. Social performance r efers mainly to the direct impact (physical, s ocial, economic, political, cultural, psychological) that MFOs have on the activities and well-being of users of their services. But wider impact, on other family members, employees, business associates, competitors, neighbours, those excluded from u sing s ervices, and institutions governing s ociety more generally, are also important. Thus social performance also includes the impact of microfinance on poverty.
The t erminology of financial and s ocial performance of an organisation is linked in turn to the concept of the "double bottom line", and the view that MFOs should aim at becoming both viable commercial organisations and catalysts of social development (Tulchin 2003) . This is a bold but fragile dream, easily subverted by populists and cynics alike. The v iew taken here is that generalisation about overall impact of microfinance, or lack of it, matters less than small steps in the right direction. This includes steps towards institutionalising a hard-headed culture of learning how to improve social performance, both within MFOs and across the microfinance industry/community.
The term "social performance" echoes the recurrent preoccupation within public policy with defining goals, assessing performance against those goals, and ensuring that there are strong feedback or performance management systems to help organisations monitor, reflect upon and improve practice. But, given the diversity and complexity of MFOs, it is important that striving for consistency, both within and between MFOs, is reconciled with the need for flexibility. For example, greater consistency in measuring the poverty of clients IDS Bulletin Vol 34 No 4 2003 would be w elcome, but not if one indicator becomes too dominant a criterion by which social performance of all MFOs is judged. The general problem is to avoid unthinking replication of what is naively regarded as universal best practice. For example, t he Grameen Bank has recently been through a quite radical process of "re-engineering" (Yunus 2002 ), but other MFOs may be right to opt for more gradual change.
Benchmarks set standards of good practice t o which members of a peer reference group are encouraged to aspire. They vary widely in scope and ambition. At one extreme a benchmark may consist of little more than a checklist of questions against which an organisation can be assessed. But benchmarks may also help to bring about greater clarity and consistency in definition of t erms, measurement of indicators, methods for evaluating performance against agreed yardsticks, and systems of quality assurance. The concept is already established in microfinance w ith r espect to financial performance (see especially MiX 2002), where t he s cope for agreement on quantitative standards are greater. But the idea of agreeing on a more general social performance benchmark is also advancing rapidly (see Zeller et al . 2003) .
A benchmark has the potential t o increase efficiency, quality and transparency of a peer group or network of organisations (Copestake 2002a) . However, the tool also carries with it real dangers. For example, benefits can be outweighed by the costs of setting up, monitoring and complying with it (Power 1997). Benchmarks can also foster an undesirable degree of uniformity, and be used as a weapon by those with power to impose their vision on others. Thus, while suggesting a rational, technical approach to development, the process of benchmarking is unavoidably political and risky. Much depends upon the level of detail to which a benchmark aspires. This article argues in favour of keeping standards simple, thereby developing a benchmark to which the vast majority of MFOs can s ubscribe. This is compatible w ith an evolutionary process of continuous improvement in s ocial performance based more on peer pressure, that is likely to be more effective than one dictated by donors, international consultants and regulators.
Care is also needed in t hinking t hrough t he political processes by which compliance with a benchmark is monitored and enforced. There is little doubt that sponsors of microfinance will use any agreed social performance benchmark to make decisions about resource allocation. If compliance with a benchmark can be reliably audited then it can help to reduce the lack of clarity, cost and inconsistency of current performance assessment and resource allocation processes. If not, then the benchmark can set up a conflict between better performance and t he appearance of better performance.
A first step in developing a simple standard for social performance of microfinance is to distinguish between internal and external requirements. The internal agenda is how to institutionalise a culture of concern with social as well as financial performance. The external agenda is to develop systems for sharing credible evidence about social performance with other stakeholders, including investors, donors, and regulators. This distinction can be clarified by comparing social and financial performance measurement (see Table 1 ).
This article starts with the internal agenda. Section 2 proposes a unified framework for selection of goals and indicators. Section 3 proposes a minimalist system for monitoring changes in client status, and Section 4 explores options for impact 
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The Schreiner framework
A useful starting point here is a distinction between six dimensions of outreach proposed by Schreiner (2002) . These are breadth, scope, depth, worth to users, cost to users and length:
q Breadth refers to the number of people with access to financial services at any moment in time. Increasing breadth of outreach is almost always an organisational goal, and one that is relatively easily defined and measured.
q Scope refers to the nature of the service being provided -loans, savings facilities, insurance products, payment services, training and so on. It should be r elatively straightforward for organisations to monitor who is using particular services, using the same systems that measure breadth. q Depth refers to the social status of users, and is based on the view that greater social value may be given to services provided to poorer people.
q Worth to clients refers to benefits arising from services. Costs to clients refers to the transaction costs (including investment of their own time) incurred obtaining these services. Combining these t wo dimensions gives net worth , or a measure of value added to client, which is the central concern of impact assessment.
q Length refers to the capacity of the organisation to s ustain provision of s ervices over time. Hence w ithin t he double bottom line framework it falls mainly under financial rather than social performance.
To s implify, t his article s uggests that a s ocial performance standard should include a statement of goals and targets with respect to breadth/scope, depth and net worth to users. The next step is then to consider mechanisms for assessing performance in relation to each.
The Greeley framework
Before doing so, however, it is worth considering how this framework r elates to t he goal of poverty reduction. Martin Greeley (article 1, this Bulletin) has proposed that it may be useful to distinguish between:
q direct impact on income poverty; q direct impact on other dimensions of poverty; q wider impact on poverty.
Direct impact refers to effects on people who are themselves clients of MFOs, plus other members of their household. Income poverty can be defined in various ways, but the currently dominant approach is to use local equivalents of the absolute '$1 a day' poverty line enshrined in t he Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to halve the proportion of people who are poor in 2015 as compared to 1990. 4 An advantage of this goal is that it is precise, universal, and links microfinance explicitly to a broader development movement (Littlefield et al . 2003 ).
However, enshrining direct impact on the number of people falling below a single income poverty line as a prime social performance yardstick would be hugely contentious. The long list of problems include reliability of per capita income estimates, their stability over time, their accuracy as a general measure of human well-being, and the tendency to discount income changes that do not happen to push individuals across a single poverty line.
Turning to the second goal, other dimensions of poverty might include food s ecurity, adequate housing, water supply, sanitation, education, health and personal freedoms. These are also enshrined in the MDGs, and their inclusion in any standard would certainly make it relevant to a wider range of MFOs. Indicators of housing quality, water access, education and life expectancy are often easier than income poverty to measure, and generally more stable over time. Personal freedom, by contrast, is harder to measure in a standard way. However, given its historical and ongoing importance t o microfinance -particularly the goal of women' s empowerment -and indeed t o t he MDG, it certainly needs to be included (Kabeer 2003) .
The third goal -wider impact on poverty -includes job creation and t he formation of community support networks, and is particularly important for organisations that do not necessarily aim to provide services for the poor, even if they are committed to poverty reduction. Incorporating w ider impacts poses additional challenges for social performance benchmarking. They are not only likely to take more time to appear but also to be harder to attribute to the influence of just one organisation. This suggests that responsibility for measuring wider impacts should be a collaborative effort between different MFOs.
Synthesis
It is fairly straightforward to combine the Schreiner and Greeley frameworks into a single typology of social performance goals. This is summarised in Table 2 . The table also indicates the next stepnamely specification of how performance goals are to be assessed. This synthesis provides a single set of concepts capable of reflecting the diverse goals of different organisations. Some MFOs may choose to align closely to the MDG by emphasising S2.1 and S2.1. Others may take a different view, but can still be accommodated: commitment to absolute poverty reduction is something t hat should be s ecured through persuasion not donor coercion. The framework also allows that the causal chain linking financial services to poverty is genuinely complex, especially when importance is attached to capacity to reduce future poverty as well as current poverty. 
Monitoring depth of outreach
The issue discussed in this section is how to track the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of users of different services over time. In retrospect, it is surprising how slow many MFOs have been to put in place s ystems for monitoring s uch basic variables as age, sex, education, location and loyalty of their clients. But this is changing as increased competition forces organisations to be more clientcentred in order to adapt to their needs (Woller 2002) . Peer pressure t o monitor not only these variables but also poverty/depth of outreach has long been central to the campaign of the Microcredit Foundation. However, t he US government has added further impetus by taking steps to require MFOs to track the poverty status of clients as a condition for future funding from USAID.
Debate continues about how this can be done. One approach, exemplified by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) Poverty Assessment Tool, separates the task from operations by delegating it to specialised consultants. An important limitation of this approach is that unless MFOs are prepared to repeat the exercise periodically it generates only an occasional and expensive s napshot of depth of outreach. Continuous poverty status monitoring is more likely to be based on routinely collected data. ACCION (2002) , for example, is using income and expenditure data collected as part of the procedure for appraisal of individual loans. A major challenge here is to ensure that data collected is sufficiently accurate and is comparable w ith benchmark national surveys.
A more cost-effective alternative is to r ely for poverty monitoring on one or a few proxy poverty indicators that are less demanding to measure than income or expenditure. This approach can then be supplemented with periodic sample-based research into how strongly the indicators correlate w ith income-based and other measures. Freedom From Hunger (FFH), for example, is piloting an approach based on relatively simple questions about food 58 Vulnerability Low -diversified portfolio High -overwhelming fear Medium/high -but at of resources through which of falling back into low cost of loss of to manage shocksgroup (e.g. through autonomy ("security separation or illness)through servitude") security, while CASHPOR 5 has pioneered the use of housing and household asset indices.
Collection of s uch data s hould generally be integrated into the same management information system t hat monitors breadth and s cope of outreach. In addition t o choice of indicators, practical issues include: w hether to collect the information r outinely for all clients or only a sample; whether to u se s taff for the job; how frequently to r epeat the exercise; and how to ensure data is reported in a way that is useful. Addressing these questions requires that a difficult balance be s truck between cost, t imeliness, reliability, adequacy and usefulness. Many systems seek to collect and analyse too much information, with the result that they are (a) too expensive to be sustained, and (b) too complex, confusing and cumbersome to influence management decisions effectively. A minimalist norm should therefore be to collect information on at least one indicator, but to do so regularly, sustainably and effectively.
Given the current level of experimentation and innovation w ith indicators, it is premature t o propose that one or even a range of indicators should become s tandard for monitoring client status. However, t here is perhaps scope for strengthening standards for the way such data is used. This does not refer to the controversial issue of poverty targeting, but to the effectiveness of reporting systems through which client status is reported t o management for operational and strategic purposes.
To illustrate, the remainder of this section sets out a minimalist model. As an alternative to systems based on a single objective poverty proxy, the illustration also r elies on a s imple t hree-fold poverty classification made by staff. Reliance on staff in this way has the advantage of encouraging them to find out more about the poverty status of clients, and to do so in a transparent yet easily quantifiable way. It need not be costly, because staff should know much of the information anyway. In addition, the quality of data is enhanced to the extent that they understand its relevance to the MFO' s social goals, and see it being used to influence policy and practice. Table 3 draws a distinction between just three categories of client, with the three categories given deliberately neutral labels (A=Upper, B=Middle, C=Lower). The multiple criteria u sed are only illustrative and could be adapted to specific social contexts. Staff might be asked to classify clients into one of these three groups when they first join, at regular periods thereafter and upon leaving. The distribution of clients in each category can then be monitored through cross-tabulation against other routinely collected data: group, area, name of field officer, branch, gender of client, age of client, age of group, length of membership of group, for example. The most useful cross-tabulations could then be generated r outinely and changes monitored over time.
Whether these or other categories are chosen, the differences between them should facilitate thinking about how financial products can be matched to client characteristics. For example, an organisation might emphasise its role in provision of either protectional finance (stopping clients falling from A to B, or from B t o C) or promotional finance (helping them rise from C to B, or from B to A). Table 4 provides a hypothetical example of the kind of r outine information t hat could be generated, in the form of a mobility matrix which compares changes in client categorisation over a one-year period. It reveals the following information:
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q Client exit was 12 per cent over the year, but new entry was 10 per cent of the base year number. Hence there was a small net decrease in breadth of outreach;
q Those leaving and entering were in the bottom and middle categories;
q Of those who were clients in both periods, 56 per cent remained in t he s ame category whereas 25 per cent improved and 10 per cent went down one category.
The same reporting format could equally be used for monitoring a classification of clients based on housing, educational attainment, average savings, self-reported household income or clients' own assessment of their well-being. Likewise, it could easily be produced for sub-groups of the total client population, including gender, age, and branch area. Production of reports by branch and field officer can also serve a quality control function.
It is important to emphasise that routine client monitoring of this kind does not itself constitute evidence of impact. For example, t he net improvement in client status observed above (25 per cent better off, 10 per cent worse off) could reflect a general improvement in t he economy. However, such information does provide a useful basis for generation of hypotheses about impact. It also clearly identifies the extent to which changing client status arises from entry and exit; a factor that often complicates interpretation of changes in social indicators.
Assessing net worth to users (impact assessment)
Impact assessment (IA) is here defined broadly as activities intended t o provide evidence of net worth, or quality of outreach, to clients as well as wider impacts. Information on breadth, scope and depth of outreach is of little value without at least some information on the extent to which use of services has also been of lasting benefit. A minimalist approach to IA might comprise only of routine assessment of client exit, on t he assumption that those who remain reveal at least some positive preference for the MFO (Copestake 2003a ). However, for most MFOs, there are also good grounds for eliciting some feedback from loyal clients, and for conducting r esearch into wider impacts.
There has been considerable donor investment in generic IA tools for microfinance, notably those developed by AIMS 6
and MicroSave-Africa (Simanowitz 2001) . The Imp-Act programme seeks to build on these, as well as to strengthen the repertoire of methods for researching w ider impact. But given the heterogeneity of MFOs, and their varied capacities, it is likely that a diverse range of approaches will continue to be useful. This section stops short of proposing a preferred list of methods; rather, it offers a broader argument about how IA is likely to be most cost-effective. It begins by emphasising the link between IA and client status monitoring. This leads to a strong argument in favour of smaller and more flexible approaches.
A client status monitoring s ystem provides an essential foundation for IA for three reasons. First, it provides a comprehensive profile of clients for sample s election purposes. Second, s ystematic reports of changes in selected indicators, such as those illustrated by Table 4 , generate hypotheses for IA. Third, it facilitates judgements as to how representative IA findings are likely to be. While knowing who your clients are, and how this is changing, is therefore a precondition for IA, it is not in itself s ufficient. This is because s tatus monitoring on its own does not explain w hy changes have taken place, and how far they can be attributed specifically to the MFO.
The monitoring s ystem may be v iewed as a detection and alarm system. This corresponds to the monitoring system already described, since this can be used to reveal unexpected deviations from expected patterns of change. For example, a sudden increase in the share of clients falling into Category C within groups managed by a particular field officer might attract attention.
The IA component of the system may be viewed as an emergency response system. IA is commissioned to explain unexpected events and deviations from trends. In this case the fall in Category C clients might be explained by poor classification by the field officer. Alternatively, clients in her area may have experienced an unexpected shock such as an increase in local theft or a disease epidemic.
If the goal is to institutionalise ways to understand impacts on different categories of client, then there is a case for localised, quick and flexible methods, rather than comprehensive but methodologically indivisible s urvey-based methods.
7 Nevertheless, so long as care is taken in documenting sampling methods and maintaining methodological consistency it should also be possible to build up a reasonable picture of impact across the w hole client population (see MkNelly et al . 2 001 for methods on qualitative s ampling). Selecting a random s ample of all clients at the outset is unlikely to be as efficient as selecting particular groups of client for investigation sequentially. Each round of detailed investigation is likely to be useful in informing choice of the next group that should be selected (Copestake 2002b) .
While arguing for a relatively flexible system, there is a strong case for including IA of both leavers and stayers. Exit is itself often a powerful statement about impact, and practical considerations also affect how it can be organised. Copestake (2003a) discusses different approaches.
Turning to consider IA of retained clients, a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods are available, and all that a benchmark should require is that MFOs justify their particular preferences. For most MFOs, the core tools are likely to be focus groups, key informant interviews and minisurveys, for which AIMS and MicroSave-Africa already provide generic protocols. Copestake, Johnson and Wright (2003) suggest there is also a need for a generic qualitative impact protocol (QUIP) based on in-depth interviews.
There is again a tension here between flexibility and consistency of approach. Technique is important, but so are goals and s cope. For example, the best method, or mix of methods, will depend upon whether the main source of demand for impact data arises from a review of specific product characteristics or wider strategic issues and policies. It will also depend u pon t he prior knowledge and understanding of the main target audience, which will determine how rigorous and comprehensive additional IA needs to be. Therefore flexibility is very important. On the other hand, consistency in use of methods and sampling makes it easier to clarify the "big picture" when combining information -ideally between MFOs as well as within them (Copestake 2003b) . It also allows suppliers of IA data to develop expertise in its production, and users to become more skilled in its interpretation.
The size of the team dedicated to impact work can be varied according to perceived need, with a work programme comprising a mixture of ad hoc and routine s tudies. Recruitment of additional investigators to support core staff can take place as required and as funding permits. A strong internal supervisory group is also essential t o monitor outputs of t he t eam and t o direct its work priorities. This leads on to the issue of performance management, or how impact monitoring and assessment data is used.
Performance management
This section s tarts by exploring w hy making effective use of impact data is not always easy. It then suggests that external stakeholders have an important role to play in overcoming some of the difficulties and suggests that a step in the right direction w ould be r outine s ocial performance auditing.
Assessing net worth to clients is not an end in itself, but a means for informing decisions about whether services can be improved. Perhaps the greatest weakness of IA in the past has been a failure to institutionalise the feedback loop whereby findings inform t he organisational goals, policies and practices. This section first discusses internal performance management, t hen broadens the discussion t o include t he r ole of external stakeholders.
Breakdown in the feedback loop often arises from the failure to analyse data in a way that generates information that is sufficiently succinct and timely to influence decisions (McCord 2 002; Imp-Act 2003). This has often been borne of lack of experience, leading to over-ambitious studies that underestimate t he cost and methodological complexity of the task. Another common problem is failure t o budget sufficient resources for discussion of findings and piloting of possible responses. However, t hese bottlenecks are themselves often a symptom of deeper issues. Most importantly, a necessary precondition for effective social performance management is a commitment to it on the part of MFO leadership (article 9, this Bulletin).
If an MFO is struggling to survive at all then social performance management is almost inevitably relegated to financial performance management. Reliable feedback may also limit its room for manoeuvre. It may be safer to hide behind weaker but bolder claims to positive impact that conform to w hat donors also w ant to hear in order to disburse funds. Improving the quality of IA is risky, because it may reveal social performance that falls short of MFO and donor rhetoric, and it is safer to rely on informal information that can, if necessary, be "buried" (Martens et al . 2002) . This is not to accuse MFO leaders of acting cynically. Rather, I think they often hesitate to invest more heavily in such work because they doubt that the additional insights they expect to gain will justify the cost. The r esult can t hen be a v icious circle: low management expectations of IA r esult in poor studies, and these reinforce the low expectations.
Public sponsorship of such work offers a potential way out of this funding trap, but also introduces a new problem. This is that conditions attached to IA divert it from models that serve MFOs' own management interests. The s olution t o t his problem is then for subsidies to be subordinated to implementation of MFO leaders' own s ocial performance management agenda. This requires a risky power reversal which may be closed off by donors' own bureaucratic s tructures of accountability (Grammig 2 002). On t he other hand, if successful, such reversals can also have positive feedback effects: good IA-improving social performance, making good s ocial performance even easier to measure. This can also encourage greater transparency, enhance the MFO' s reputation and make it easier to mobilise resources.
It follows from t he above t hat organisations committed t o finding s uch positive s ocial performance s pirals should be interested in developing internal quality assurance mechanisms. An important issue here is the division of labour for such "higher loop" organisational learning between operational and s pecialist staff. The latter are needed to ensure that the task is not buried, but the need for realism and ownership of t he process require t hat such s pecialists also have t o w ork closely with other staff (Edwards 1997; Copestake 2000) .
The work of specialist units can also be the core contact point for independent auditors. This is also likely to be a more cost-effective approach t o auditing than the traditional independent IA study. The idea of a periodic social performance audit is currently underdeveloped, yet corresponds more closely to t hat adopted for validating financial performance (Cheston and Reed 1999). 8 Ideas for elaborating on the idea can also be drawn in part from t he experience of s ocial ethical accounting (Zadek and Raynard 1995). 9 Experience with institutional auditing, or external reviewing of management structures and systems are also relevant (see USAID 2000) . However, the proposal for social performance auditing is narrower in its focus on clients rather than other stakeholders, and on outcomes rather than internal processes. As such there may be an even closer link to be forged between the idea and growing interest in developing MFO codes for consumer protection, since the process of assessing impact on clients is closely linked t o t he extent of t heir prior understanding of the services they use. This is particularly important for an industry that enters into quite complex and open-ended contracts with often poor and weakly informed clients, who may have a quite limited u nderstanding of s uch fundamental concepts as interest rates.
There are at least four elements to implementing the idea of social performance auditing. First, there is a need t o agree on a s ocial performance benchmark. This article argues for a very simple standard t hat boils down t o r eviewing internal processes of goal setting, client status monitoring, IA and quality assurance.
A second element is development of a protocol for the process of conducting a social performance audit to check how far an MFO complies with its own guidelines. The protocol might include steps for:
q reviewing documentation about the organisation and its internal s ocial performance monitoring system; q interviewing staff at all levels of the MFO about how this system is utilised in practice;
q sampling and t esting t he v alidity of data generated by the system; q assessing how information is actually used, using a framework s imilar to t he feedback loop, but applied to the whole performance management system rather than to one study.
The third element is the establishment of national and international pools of s ocial performance auditors willing and able to carry out such audits.
The reputation of such auditors would serve in no small measure to validate the process.
Finally, MFOs and t heir sponsors need t o be convinced of the potential value of such audits. Further work is needed to develop the idea of social performance audits, building on these ideas and drawing further on lessons learnt from closely related activities, including experience with gender and poverty audits, institutional assessment, financial audits and inspections by regulators. Such work needs to be participatory, r eflecting t he interest and character of different kinds of MFO and stakeholders. Hence MFO networks are likely to play an important role, and in s ome cases particular networks may be able to raise the stakes by agreeing on standards that are more detailed and specific than the one proposed here.
Conclusions
By way of conclusion, the main arguments of this article can be quickly summarised. 3. The key to institutionalising client status monitoring is routine production of s imple reporting t ables that reveal mobility of clients between a relatively small number of categories, while at the same time taking into account new entry and exit.
4. Impact assessment should be (a) integrated closely with client status monitoring, and (b) based on a continuous, flexible and divisible programme of data collection, analysis and reporting.
5. Internal quality assurance systems should be underpinned by independent social performance auditing. 4. Strictly it is the $1.08 dollar a day per person yardstick at 1993 purchasing power parity exchange rates.
Notes
CASHPOR (Credit and Savings for the Hard-Core
Poor of Asia-Pacific) is an association of Grameen bank replications in Asia.
6.AIMS (Assessing t he Impact of Microenterprise
Services) is a USAID-sponsored research project in microfinance impact assessment. A manual of five tools for use by practitioners was produced by the project in collaboration with the US Microenterprise Network, SEEP.
7.Methodological indivisibility refers to the problem that attribution of impact based solely on statistical analysis of client and control groups requires a minimum s ample s ize and r esearch effort. In contrast, focus groups and in-depth interviews address the attribution issue mainly through interpretation of the consistency of multiple sources of data (see Copestake et al . 2001 
